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What is “Conservation?”
To this audience, whose members have been In the conservation mcvement
for years, and who both pract~ce and advocate SO1l and water conservation
measures, It may seem to be a meaningless exercise to define what we mean
by “conservation.” Yet, the term is often used loosely, and m such a
way as to convey wrong Impressions. While we can apply the term to any
natural resource, I will use it m the context of soil.
People occasionally suggest that conservation is “non-use.” “Preser-
vation” is a more accurate term with which to describe non-use. To carry
the point further, conservation does not mean reducing the rate of soil
loss to zero. It means, however,
time as compared to a use pattern
during a planning period. Hence,
the deferred use of a resource to a later
in wh~ch the resource is used earlier
we can refer to “s011 conserving practices”
such as rotatzons which Include several years of legumes. The use of
terraces and contouring are further examples of conservation practices.
The soil is being used, and some 1s being lost. However, less is being
lost than would be the case with a rotation with a heavier emphasis on row
crops, or with not using practices such as terracing and contouring.
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are gratefully acknowledged.Again, the rate of SO1l loss is not reduced to zero, However, the rate
of loss is reduced, thereby contribute-ng to a higher rate of productlv~ty
in the future.
The Incentives of Producers
“Investment” basically ls the deferring of present consumption in order
to achieve more consumption at a later date. Since conservation involves
such a tradeoff, the basic elements of this decision are similar to any
decision regarding investment.
Investment decisions regarding soil conservation are made by individual
farmer-producers m accordance with their perceived self interest. To put
it in simpler terms, “farmers will do what they see to be profitable.” The
actions of producers may be modified by soczety through rules, regulations,
taxes and subsidies to be consistent with social goals. Ethical and social
values (conservation practices which are considered to be socially respon-
sible and which draw praise from the community) may also affect individual
actions. The producer is nonetheless faced with the hard profit-loss decl-
slons faced by any entrepreneur of a compet~tive enterprise.
The basics of the Investment decision, then, are the costs incurred
for the present relative to returns realized m the future. The catch 1s,
however, costs and returns to whom? The reason why the decisions of a
private entrepreneur become a matter for public policy is that short run
decisions for the producer may not be consistent with the long run decisions
for society. Let us take a closer look at the dec~sion process and the
nature of the costs and returns to see why this may be so.
In an Investment decision, the present value of the costs are compared
with the present value of the anticipated returns. Normally, the costs occurearly m the plannlng period--the returns later. The existence of an
Interest rate means that the present value of future benefits are reduced.
A quick glance at the accompanying table shows that benefits received far
out in the plannlng period tend to be relatively lnslgniflcant in terms of
present value. Furthermore, as the interest rate rises, the present value
of future amounts becomes even less. At 20%, the present value of $1,000
fifty years from now is only eleven cents.
The cost of an investment In conservation practices may be in terms of
capital expenditures, reduced income because of emphasis on grass and legumes
rather than row crops, or because of leaving more of the field in grassed
waterways. The costs of these investments and the foregone income could
either be engoyed as consumption, or invested in alternative projects.
Thus , the rate of return on the investment must be at least equal to the
rate of return m alternative Investments. If this is not the case, the
producer simply does not have the market incentive to undertake conservation
projects. Again, present interest rates make Income received more than ten
to twelve years from now relatively insignificant.
Institutions having responsibility for maintaining soil productivity,
such as the U.S. Soil Conservation Service, have been lamenting that the
nation has “gone backward” recently in terms of soil conservation programs.
There are several factors which have contributed to this. First, the high
farm prices since the early 1970s have brought additional land into produc-
tion, some of which is marginal, and which has high potential for wind and
water erosion. Furthermore, high prices for row crops such as corn and
soybeans increases the cost (in terms of foregone income) of maintaining a









































































50 87.20 21.32 3.46 .92 .11A second factor is high Interest rates. As we again note from Table
1, h~gher interest rates penal~ze future benef~ts which would be reallzed
from conservation practices.
StIll another factor 1s the introduction of ever larger machinery which
us less compatible with terraces and contouring. The incentive is for pro-
ducers to tear out windbreaks and fencerows and to plow up waterways in
order to have fields which are larger and more convenient for big machinery.
While it is difficult to say how much each of these factors contributes,
casual observation is consistent w~th warnings of conservation agencies. I
see fields near my home area in Southern Wisconsin which I remember as being
contoured, now being plowed straight through by large machmery. Parts of
fields formerly left in grassed waterways are now planted to corn. While
the market Incentives are to farm intensively, the eroded soil and sediments
washed off those fields are clearly not in the longer run interests of
society. While this example is only a personal observation, let us look at
some empirical evidence to see what market incentives are. Followlng that,
we will look more m detail at the nature of, and reasons for, the dilemma
of the divergence between goals of the individual and of socxety.
Empirical Evidence
As we look at empirical evidence regarding market Incentives two points
need to be made. First, not all farmers use only market incentives as their
total basis for decision making. Most producers consider to some degree a
stewardship responsibility for land. Furthermore, a farm version of “peer
pressure” exists. Pos~tlve rewards in terms of recognition, and negative
sanctions in terms of neighborhood disapproval exist. Yet, in view of the
current situation, these obviously are not sufficient. Factors which weaken6
the effect of posltlve non-monetary rewards and negative sanctions are a
degree of absentee landownership, and farm neighborhoods which are less
close than in the days of neighborhood cooperation In threshing, shredding
and silo-filling. Today’s farmer is likely to be similar to the urban
resident that never visits, or perhaps does not even know, the resident
across the street.
The second point in looking at empirical evidence is that at this
stage we are not attempting to specify what producers should do. We are
simply looking at where the market incentives lie. To the extent that
market lncent~ves produce actions that diverge from the goals of society,
we w1ll need to look at alternatives for public policy. The highpomts of
several empirical studies follow:
An Illinois study concludes that sediment damage
high as 16% of net income per acre. Each area should
from erosion is as
separately determine
which combination of crop rotation, tillage system, and conservation practice
1/
is best from society’s point of view.—
A second Illinois study concluded
change crop and tillage methods unless
2/
income.— A study of another Illinois
cost of soil erosion were computed, It
that farmers had no incentive to
sediment damage was included in
watershed concluded that if total
would be in society’s Interest for
“Economic Analysis of Erosion and Sedimentation: Upper Embarras River Basin.
Illinois Institute for Environmental Quality Document No. 74-41. April
1975.
gLee ~ ~
. Narayanan, A. S., and Swanson, E. R. Economic Analysis of
Ero;ion a;; Sedimentation: Sevenmile Creek Southwest Branch Watershed.
Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Experiment Station, University
of Illinois, Illinois Institute for Environmental Quality Document No.
74-30. December 1974.7
farmers to change rotations and tillage practices.3’
Another Illmols study concluded that on the watershed studied, conser-
vation tillage methods could reduce sedimentation by 50%, and leave net
farm
than
Income at current levels. However, reductions in sediment by more
50% would be at the expense of farm income.~’
A 1979 study concludes that unless a more effective public pollcy is
instituted, much of the A horizon soil will be lost within a 100 year
periods’
A Southern Iowa study concludes that the costs of reduc~ng erosion to
“tolerable levels”
6/
is three times higher than the benefits.—
A recent Pennsylvania study concludes that in the short run, a strict
7/
soil loss policy could reduce the income of dairy farmers.—
An Idaho study concludes that soil conserving practices reduces the
8/
income of wheat farmers.—
3’Narayanan, A. S., Lee, M. T., Guntermann, Karl, Seitz, W. D., and Swanson,
E. R. Economic Analysis of Erosion and Sedimentation: Mendota West Fork
Watershed. Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Experiment Sta-
tion, University of Illinois. Illinois Institute for Environmental Quality
Document No. 74-13. April 1974.
~/Narayanan, A ~ ~., and Swanson, ~ ~
. . . . “Estimating trade-offs between
sedimentat~on and farm income.” Journal of Soil and Water Conservation
27(6):262-264. November-December 1972.
~/seitz w D
. Taylor, C. R., Spltze, R. G. F., Osteen, C., and Nelson> M“
“Econ;mic l;~acts of soil erosion control.” Land Economics 55(1):28-42.
February 1979.
&/usDA Scs
. Soil Depletion Study Reference Report: Southern Iowa Rivers
Basi;.
~lmite ~ ~ . ., and Partenheimer, E. J. “Economic impacts of eros~on and
sedim~ntation control plans: Case studies of Pennsylvania dairy farmers.”
Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 35(2):76-78. March-April 1980.
tywalker ~ ~
. . Developing a Soil Loss Damage Function: Does ErosIon Pay.
A. E. ~esearch Series No. 231, University of Idaho. July 1980.One could go on. But the point 1s made that the pure market incentives
9/





The goal of society is to have an adequate food supply at reasonable
today, and to ensure that future generations will be provided resources
which to produce an adequate food supply for themselves. A further
of society is to maintain non-point pollution at a level which 1s
not injurious to water quality and which is consistent with a dependable
food Supply. The goal of producers is to manage their farms to achieve a
satisfactory level of living today and to bequeath a viable operation to
their children.
The goals of the individual and society may differ because of two
factors: 1) the previously mentioned time factor and 2) the matter of
external costs. Let us examme each of these in turn.
For both producers and society, investment involves the tradeoff between
a lower level of consumption today for an anticipated higher level in the
future. A major problem, however, is that the time dimension of Individuals
and society differs. W~thm a generation, or even two generations, income
losses due to erosion may not be noticeable, particularly to the extent
that technology overcomes or “masks” the effect of erosion.
From society’s perspective, however, the individual planning horizon
is too short. Individuals perceive no market incentive, especially at high
interest rates, to make investments for which the payoffs are uncertain and
far Into the future. Most individuals are not confronted with the problem
“For a more complete list of references on economic incentives and soil
conservation see: Kerestes, D. and K. W. Easter, A Review and An
Annotated Bibliography of Studzes of Soil Conservation Programs, Practices
and Strategies. Dept. of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University
of Minnesota Staff Paper P81-1. January 1981.of Irreversible damage of the soil resource within their planning period.
Thus the marlcet falls to provide adequately for the future.
The second source of market failure is the matter of external costs.
A part of the cost of soil erosion is sedimentation of lakes and streams.
This cost 1s incident on society m general. Costs of sedimentat~on to the
individual responsible for erosion are insignificant or zero. Since the
existing market provides no means for the costs of sedimentation to be
realized by the individuals responsible, the actions of the Individuals are
again not in accord with the goals of society.
Policy Options
The central question is, “What combination of soil loss and food produc-
tion does present day society wish to achieve’” Soil loss could be reduced
to near zero. But this would be at tremendous cost in terms of foregone food
production. These costs are greater than soczety wishes to incur. The objec-
tive, then, is a tolerable rate of soil erosion consistent with adequate
food production. Further, because of the market incentives, society prefers
a lower rate of soil erosion than is currently induced by marlcet forces.
Let us briefly examine several policy options.
One possibility would be that of regulations for tlllage practices.
This would limit farmers in their choice of production methods. For example,
farmers might have to increase small grains and grass-legumes n their rota-
tions. The effect of this policy would increase cost of food production and
decrease output. This m turn would drive up food prices and reduce the
U.S. competitive position in international markets.
Another alternative would be to tax soil loss. The effect of this
might be to Increase food prices through the effect of reduced production.10
Under either the regulation or SO1l loss tax approach which would tend to
decrease production and Increase food prices, low income consumers would
bear a large part of the burden of sod conservation.
There are other policy options which may be more palatable to farmers
and perhaps to consumers as well. Farmers could be subsidized indirectly
or directly for reducing soil erosion. They could receive payments for
adopting certain cropping practices or rotat~ons. A policy In operation
for some time is cost-sharing and technical assistance by the Soil Conserva-
tion Service for adopting practices such as contouring, strip cropping, and
terracing.
Taxes and regulations strike a negative chord, especially during these
times when so many people seem to be questioning what they perceive to be
“government intrusion into private affairs.” There is a cost of adminis-
tering programs of regulations and soil loss taxes. Regarding subsidies,
the taxpayer tends to question the legitimacy of subsidizing a farmer for
“what he should be doing anyway.” The proposition that there is a diver-
gence between private incentives and publlc object~ves often becomes lost
in policy discussions.
A policy tool that is increasingly discussed is to tle eligibdlty
for government price and income support programs to compliance with soil
conservation practices. A producer might be required to use recommended
conservation practices, for example, to quallfy for a price support program.
Producers who cultivated land recommended left in permanent pasture could
be denied participation.
These possible methods each have their limitations. There are two
other points that merit discussion, however. The first of these IS11
technology. The “big machinery” technology has undoubtedly been a factor
which has g~ven a dlsmcent~ve to follow SO1l conserving practices. How
ever, one must feel that we have hardly begun to adequately explorethe
technology involving, for example, minimum tlllage methods, tillage practices
which would leave more residue on the ground or which in other ways would
make high value crops consistent with soil conservation. This would seem
to be a high priority area forresearch by government and Land Grant institu-
tions.
A second point is the matter of a “conservation ethic.” It has been
said that civilization depends on the willingness of people to follow
unwritten rules. No government can regulate everything. Regulations are
costly and unpopular at best. However cold reality dictates that they are
often necessary. My safety in crossing the street IS dependent on the
assurance that you will stop your vehicle in recognition of the red light.
But again, since not everything can be regulated, the limited capacity of
government must be directed toward those “rules of the game” deemed most
urgent.
If a “conservat~on ethic” can be fostered, government rules and regu-
lations for soil conservationmay not be as necessary. However, as we have
seen, the market incentives do not favor It. Further, the loss in rural
ne~ghborhood solidarity has reduced the peer pressure for adopting conser-
vation practices. Groups and associations such as the Soil Conservation
Society can do much toward fostering such an ethic, and can provide extremely
valuable educational programs, and group support for conservat~on efforts.
This is an example of a set of activities conducted by an assoc~atlon of
individuals with the government being a cooperator instead of a negative
rule-maker or enforcer. Again, however, we must be pragmat~c and recognize12
that as long as individual incentives are not consistent with social goals,
we are facing the necessity of public pollcy options which may affect the
actions of the mdxv~dual producer.
Surnmary
The market creates incentives for the producer wh~ch lead to a rate of
soil erosion greater than that consistent with publlc policy objectives.
Therefore, methods are needed to reduce SO1l erosion to levels consistent
wth public policy objectives. Technology oriented toward cropping and
tillage practices more consistent with soil conservation is a step in that
direction. The fostering of a “conservation ethic” may reduce the necess~ty
for rules and regulations on cropping and tillage practices. Yet, as long
as the market incentives lead to actions not consistent with social Object-
ives, policy options including taxes, regulations, subsidies, and techn~cal
assistance will be increasingly discussed as alternatives to help reduce
the rate of erosion.